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This iBrief discusses the constitutionality of a government policy enacted 
shortly after September 11, 2001 that denies public access to deportation 
hearings in cases allegedly bearing some connection to terrorism.  This 
ibrief discusses two Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions on the issue and 
argues that this policy is unconstitutional. 
BACKGROUND  
¶1 In the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government launched a massive 
investigation to uncover those responsible for the attacks and to thwart future terrorist activity.2  As part of 
this effort, on September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, acting under direction from 
Attorney General John Ashcroft, issued a directive to Immigration Judges mandating that cases designated as 
special interest by the Department of Justice be closed to the public.3  Special interest cases are those where 
the alien is suspected of having connections to, or information about, terrorist organizations that are plotting 
against the United States.4  In addition to closure to all visitors, family, and press, the directive further 
requires that the cases be removed from the public docket so that the case’s existence is not publicly known.5  
This total ban on public access was challenged by various media entities in two separate cases, resulting in a 
split between the Third and Sixth Circuits as to whether the ban is constitutional.6  In August 2002, the Sixth 
Circuit held the ban unconstitutional;7 in October 2002, the Third Circuit held the ban was constitutional.8 The 
plaintiff in the Third Circuit petitioned for a writ of certiorari, but the Supreme Court declined to hear the 
case.9 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT OF ACCESS 
¶2 The First Amendment to the Constitution states, in pertinent part, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ”10 The Supreme Court has held that, although the First 
                                                     
1 A.B., Dartmouth College, 2001; J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2005. 
2 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2002). 
3 Id. at 683. 
4 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002). 
5 Id. at 203. 
6 See id; see also Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681. 
7 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710. 
8 North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 221. 
9 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003). 
10 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
Amendment does not explicitly create a right of access to court proceedings, a right of access does exist when 
“the place and the process have historically been open to the press and general public [and] public access 
plays a significant positive role in the functions of the particular process in question.”11 Although formalized 
by the Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,12 this rationale was first articulated in Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,13 and thus is typically referred to by courts 
as the Richmond Newspapers test.14 
Recent history of First Amendment and National Security 
¶3 This is not the first time in U.S. history that the courts have been asked to weigh concerns over 
national security against the Constitution’s free speech guarantee.  In the wake of the Vietnam War, when 
fears of a communist attack on the U.S. were widespread, the Supreme Court considered the government’s 
national security concerns against the media’s First Amendment rights.  In the seminal case of New York 
Times Co. v. United States the government sought to prevent the publication of the Pentagon Papers, a 
government-sanctioned analysis of the errors of the Vietnam War.  The Court held that the government’s 
national security concerns did not trump the news media’s First Amendment rights.15  The Court was adamant 
that national security concerns should not serve to dismantle the meaning of the First Amendment and the 
protection it provides the news media: “In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the 
protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy.”16  The Court defined that role as 
providing a check on what is otherwise an extremely powerful Executive, particularly in the national security 
arena, where the Executive enjoys wide latitude.  The Court further noted that “the Government’s power to 
censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government.”17  The 
Court’s analysis was well-grounded in the actual intent of the Framers; consider the comments of Patrick 
Henry at the Virginia ratification convention, “Congress may carry on the most wicked and pernicious of 
schemes under the dark veil of secrecy.  The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when 
the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them.”18  Justice Douglas reflected this sentiment, 
stating, “secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic.”19 
                                                     
11 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-606 (1982)). 
12 Id. 
13 Richmond Newspapers Co. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
14 See, e.g., North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2002). 
15 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
16 Id. at 718 (Black, with Douglas, J., concurring). 
17 Id. 
18North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 210 (quoting 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 169-70 (J. Elliot ed. 1881)). 
19 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 724 (Douglas, with Black, J., concurring). 
THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE SIXTH AND THIRD CIRCUITS 
The Sixth Circuit held the Creppy directive unconstitutional: Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft 
¶4 A series of hearings in the deportation action for Rabih Haddad, an alien who “overstayed his tourist 
visa” was commenced on December 19, 2002.20  Haddad’s case was designated as a special interest case 
because of suspicion that the “Islamic charity . . . [he] operates supplies funds to terrorist organizations.”21  
Consequently, the hearings in Haddad’s case were closed to the public and the press.22  Haddad, along with 
several newspapers and Congressman John Conyers, who had wished to attend the hearings, commenced an 
action against Attorney General John Ashcroft, Chief Immigration Judge Creppy, and the Immigration Judge 
presiding over Haddad’s case, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.23  Most relevant here, the plaintiffs 
“sought a declaratory judgment that the Creppy directive, facially and as applied, violated their First 
Amendment rights of access to Haddad’s deportation proceedings.”24  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan held for the plaintiffs, holding that the ban on access to the proceedings constituted an 
unconstitutional abridgment of the plaintiff’s First Amendment right of access.25  The government appealed 
the decision.26  The Sixth Circuit, however, affirmed the District Court’s holding.27  In its opinion, the Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that, under the Richmond Newspapers test, there was a sufficient history of openness in 
deportation hearings and significantly positive effects from allowing media access to create a right of access 
under the First Amendment.28  The Court went on to conclude that the government’s national security 
concerns did not survive strict scrutiny, reasoning that although national security is a compelling interest, the 
ban was not narrowly tailored.29  The government did not pursue a writ of certiorari.30  
The Third Circuit upheld the ban: North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft  
¶5 Concerned that they were being closed out of “possibly hundreds” of deportation proceedings in the 
New Jersey area as a consequence of the Creppy directive, the North Jersey Media Group, “the publisher of 
two daily newspapers serving the northern Jersey area,” filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for New 
Jersey, arguing that the closure of hearings in special interest cases was unconstitutional.31  The plaintiffs 
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prevailed in the District Court;32 however, the decision was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit.33  The Third Circuit reasoned that under the Richmond Newspapers test, no right of access 
existed because there was an insufficient history of openness for deportation hearings and too many 
potentially negative ramifications from allowing media access to the proceedings existed.34  The plaintiffs 
pursued a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, but the Court declined to hear the case.35 
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT: THE CREPPY DIRECTIVE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
¶6 The Third Circuit found that there was no right of access to deportation proceedings because a.) there 
is not a history of openness for deportation hearings and b.) there are significant negatives to allowing 
openness.36  However, the court’s reasoning on both these points is problematic.  First, in concluding there is 
an insufficient history of openness, the Court discarded strong arguments rooted in principles of statutory 
interpretation.37  Current immigration laws provide for the closing of exclusion hearings “while remaining 
silent on deportation proceedings.”38  Under the principle of expressio unius est exclusion alterius, the fact 
that the statute specifically closes exclusion proceedings but is silent as to deportation proceedings creates a 
presumption of openness for deportation hearings.39  If the statute’s silence on deportation proceedings creates 
any ambiguity, that ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the alien.40  Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded, based on a review of the evidence offered, that “deportation proceedings historically have been 
open.”41  The Third Circuit admitted that it was “tempted” by the expressio unius est exclusion alterius 
doctrine argument.42  However, the court declined to follow its logic, because of a handful of examples where 
deportation proceedings are closed.  These include situations where abused alien children are involved, as 
well as some deportation proceedings held in places where physical access is not readily available, such as 
prisons.43  These arguments, however, are unavailing, particularly in light of the strong statutory argument.  
Cases involving abused alien children certainly constitute a special category, the treatment of which should 
not be extrapolated and applied to the whole.44  Similarly, while places such as prisons are not easily 
accessible to the public, there is no indication that the public could not attend these proceedings if they so 
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wished.45  The strong statutory construction in favor of openness should not be outweighed by these 
arguments.  Thus, the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the first part of the Richmond Newspapers test was not 
satisfied was incorrect.   
¶7 Similarly, the Third Circuit’s conclusion that there are not significant positive benefits from openness 
is problematic.  The Court rightly pointed out that both the positive and negative effects of openness should 
be weighed in considering this aspect of the test.46  However, the Court placed too much weight on the 
negative effects.  The Sixth Circuit advanced five positive effects from openness,47 none of which the Third 
Circuit refuted.48  The Sixth Circuit’s identified the following five positive effects: “public access acts as a 
check on the actions of the Executive by assuring us that proceedings are conducted fairly and properly,”49 
“openness ensures that government does its job properly; that it does not make mistakes,”50 the hearings have 
a “cathartic effect” on people’s raw emotions in the wake of September 11,51 “openness enhances the 
perception of integrity and fairness,”52 and public access ensures the ability of citizens to “participate in and 
contribute to our republican system of government.”53  “[T]he Government has not identified one persuasive 
reason,” the Sixth Circuit continued, “why openness would play a negative role in the process.”54  However, 
the Third Circuit noted several possible negatives, each relating to disclosure of information regarding the 
investigation into terrorist activity in the United States and the extent to which such disclosure would impede 
that investigation.55  While these concerns are certainly valid, the dissent points out that they are “not 
generally implicated in the panoply of deportation hearings that occur throughout the United States.”56  The 
dissent goes on to conclude that the fact that national security concerns may exist in a handful of deportation 
hearings is not “sufficient justification for rejecting a qualified right of access to deportation hearings in 
general.”57  The dissent argues forcefully that to “permit concerns relevant only to a discrete class of cases to 
determine there is no qualified right of access to any of the broad range of deportation proceedings” would 
contravene the purpose and the language of the Richmond Newspapers test.58  Thus, a right of access does 
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exist and national security concerns should be addressed on a case-by-case basis in the proceedings in which 
they are implicated, applying the strict scrutiny standard when the right of access is abridged.59  
¶8 Having determined that a right of access does exist, the inquiry turns to whether the Creppy 
directive’s total ban on access to cases of special interest survives a strict scrutiny test.  The Sixth Circuit 
stated, a “government action that curtails a First Amendment right of access ‘in order to inhibit the disclosure 
of sensitive information’ must be supported by a showing ‘that denial is necessitated by a compelling 
governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’”60  Both the Sixth Circuit and the 
dissent in the Third Circuit agreed that national security is a compelling interest.61  However, both the Sixth 
Circuit and the dissent in the Third Circuit agree that the Creppy directive total ban fails the ‘narrowly 
tailored’ prong of the strict scrutiny test.62  The courts argue that the total ban is not the least restrictive 
alternative because a case-by-case review, in which the government can “make the required showing of 
special interest, under seal to the Immigration Judge, subject to appellate review” is a viable option.63  
Because an alternative, which can achieve the same objective of protecting sensitive information, is available 
to the government, they may not choose the more restrictive option, expressed in the Creppy directive. 
CONCLUSION   
¶9 The tragic events of September 11, 2001 marked a turning point in American history, signaling the 
start of a terrorism-centered focus for the FBI, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
commencement of the open-ended ‘War On Terrorism.’  The attacks triggered widespread fear and anxiety, 
particularly within those parts of the country directly hit by the terrorists.  However, September 11th did not 
change the fundamental core of this country.  Our Constitution and the system of government for which it 
provides, including its protection of civil liberties, remain intact in the wake of September 11, as they have in 
the wake of past national tragedies in American history.  Many argue that the threat posed by terrorism 
demands that we curtail civil liberties to enable the perpetuation of the United States.  However, the 
Constitution’s protections of civil liberties are specifically designed to preserve the country in perpetuity.  As 
the court stated in New York Times, “The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need to 
defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial governments, sought to give this new society 
strength and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly should not be 
abridged.”64  Thus, concerns for self-preservation should not be met by limiting civil liberties; concerns for 
self-preservation must be met following the Constitution and preserving civil liberties.  The perpetuation of 
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the United States goes hand in hand with the perpetuation of civil liberties.  We cannot allow ourselves to fall 
into the trap of false security that comes with compromising those liberties.  Our civil liberties have enabled 
American strength and prosperity in the past, and we must not countenance a future where those civil liberties 
no longer form the bedrock of our government. 
 
